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Abstract: We introduce a synthetic control methodology to study policies with stag-
gered adoption. Many policies, such as the board gender quota, are replicated by other
policy setters at different time frames. Our method estimates the dynamic average
treatment effects on the treated using variation introduced by the staggered adoption
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employment for female professionals.
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1. Introduction
In the political arena, many policies are adopted by learning or taking ideas from other policy
setters (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000), which provide opportunities to study the effectiveness
of a policy being adopted by multiple policy setters at varying time periods. In this paper we
propose a new synthetic control method for policies with staggered adoption. We estimate
a model for each unit using all other units by the synthetic control method, and then
simultaneously estimate all unit× time treatment effects. By doing this, we avoid assuming
too strong homogeneity across treatment effects like the generalized difference-in-difference,
and use all important units in forming the synthetic control, even if some of them have
already been treated.
Our proposed method overcomes limitations in two commonly used methodologies. First,
the generalized difference-in-difference method, with a time and a unit fixed effect, is com-
monly used in settings with staggered adoption. The time fixed effect takes out common
shocks for all units in each time period, mitigating the concern that the treatment effect is
driven by confounding events. Conceptually, removing these time specific shocks, and unit
time-invariant characteristics, we can examine treatment effects by aligning the effects by
treatment time, assuming there is parallel trend among all units. However, recent economet-
ric literature shows that in settings with dynamic treatment effects, the estimated treatment
effects are difficult to interpret because the weights of the treatment effects can be negative
(Borusyak and Jaravel, 2016; de Chaisemartin and D’Haultffuille, 2018; Goodman-Bacon,
2018; Abraham and Sun, 2018; Athey and Imbens, 2018; Callaway and Sant’Anna, 2018).
The reason is the the generalized difference-in-different implicitly assumes strong homogene-
ity on the treatment effects. Further, in our setting where the outcomes are aggregated at
the country-level, parallel trends often fail to hold. For example, we may not expect female
employment in Norway to have the same trend as that in the United Kingdom.
The second commonly used method, synthetic control, mitigates some of the two limi-
tations above, and are often used in comparative case studies with a moderate number of
aggregated units (Abadie et al., 2010). However, there is an issue when synthetic control
is used in a staggered adoption setting: often the best candidates for synthetic control are
those units that were treated at a different time period, yet current synthetic control meth-
ods only use units that are never treated as synthetic control candidates. In settings where
majority of the units are treated at some point in time, synthetic control method may fail
to construct a “good” synthetic control unit.
Further, we mainly focus on the dynamic effects of policies by looking at the average
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treatment effects on the treated for some periods after treatment (event-time ATT). That
is, we are interested in how the effects evolve along the time after policies are implemented.
Our framework can be readily extended to other parameters of interest.
We apply the staggered synthetic control method to study the effects of board gender
diversity policies introduced in a staggered time frame across 14 countries in EU. Two chal-
lenges motivate the use of staggered synthetic control in this setting. First, we are interested
in the long run impact of the policies on employment outcomes. Since these outcome vari-
ables are available at the aggregated country level, the moderate number of observations
may not fulfill the large sample assumption used in a generalized diff-in-diff asymptotics.
Generalized diff-in-diff, as discussed above, also does not correspond to meaningful esti-
mates in dynamic treatment effects. Second, there are only few European countries with
no policy yet, such as Cyprus and Malta, which tend to be smaller and less comparable
to the treated European countries, such as France and Belgium. As such, using traditional
synthetic control, we have limited control candidates.
Using our proposed methodology, we first show that corporate board female ratio in-
creased significantly after the policy announcements. This increase is realized gradually
from an average of 2% increase in the first year after the policy announcement, to 6% in-
crease after four years. We then examine how the board gender policies affect labor outcomes
related to gender equality. We study the extent to which female invests in their career by
looking at part-time employment. If a higher female presentation at the board encourages
other female employees in believing a weaker glass ceiling, these female employees may be
less likely to switch from full-time to part-time employment for family reasons. We find
evidence supporting this effect for the professional occupation group, where there is a 10%
decrease in part-time female to male ratio, and around 4% increase in full-time female to
male ratio. We do not observe similar effects, however, for workers and basic employees.
We aim to make two contributions. First, we propose an adaptation of the synthetic
control methodology to allow other treated units to be part of the synthetic control. As
discussed above, our methodology provides many advantages over alternative methods, par-
ticularly the ability to study dynamic effects. Second, we provide insights on the dynamic
effects of board gender equality policies to mitigate the glass ceiling. While prior papers
focus on short term firm level impacts, we find that the policies have long term societal im-
pact. In particular, the policies motivate more female professionals to work full-time instead
of part-time.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the main ideas behind
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the staggered synthetic control approach to policy interventions implemented in a staggered
time frame. In Section 3 we apply the proposed staggered synthetic control methods to
estimate the effect of board gender diversity policies in the EU.
2. Synthetic Control Methods for Staggered Adoption of Policies
In this section, we propose a clear framework that enables estimation of various parameters
of interest including event-time ATT (defined in Section 2.5). Our inference procedure is
based on Andrews’ end-of-sample instability test. We give formal assumptions under which
the proposed procedure has asymptotically correct size.
2.1. A Rubin model
Consider Rubin’s potential outcome model and assume SUTVA. A panel of N × (T + S) is
observed for outcome variable yi,t and treatment status di,t. The potential outcome is
yi,t =
yi,t(1), if di,t = 1,yi,t(0), otherwise.
For t = 1, . . . , T , no units are treated, i.e., di,t = 0 if t ≤ T . Note that this framework rules
out the impact of timing, i.e., the timing of each treatment does not affect the potential
outcome so that the outcome is only a function of the treatment status. Throughout, assume
T →∞ and S and N are fixed.
The individual treatment effects are defined by
τi,t = yi,t(1)− yi,t(0)
for (i, t) with di,t = 1. Let τi,t = 0 for di,t = 0 for notation simplicity. Let τ ∈ RK be the
vectorization of τi,t’s such that unit i has been treated at time t, i.e., τ = (τi,t)(i,t)∈D where
D = {(i, t) : di,t = 1}. Our parameter of interest is γ = Lτ for some linear transformation L.
Examples include event-time ATT and difference of various types of treatment assignments.
See Section 2.5 for details.
2.2. An invertibility assumption
We allow for full flexibility on the form of treatment effects and do not impose any para-
metric restriction. Since we assume the number of units and the number of post-treatment
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time periods are small relative to the number of pre-treatment time periods, the individual
treatment effects are not identified from the data. In order to learn useful information about
the treatment effect, we discuss a key assumption in this section.
We first define the individual synthetic control weights and their limits. Namely, letâi
b̂i
 = arg min
(a,b)∈Wi
T∑
t=1
(yi,t − a− Ytb′)2, (2.1)
where Wi = {β = (β0, β1, . . . , βN )′ ∈ R× RN+ : βi = 0,
∑N
j=1 βj = 1}. Then, let
ai = plim âi, bi = plim b̂i,
and we only consider cases where they are well-defined (see Appendix B for lower level
assumptions under which âi and b̂i converge).
For each i and t, define the specification error by
ui,t = yi,t(0)− (ai + Yt(0)′bi). (2.2)
Note that the i-th entry of bi is zero. Define a = (a1, . . . , aN )
′, B = (b1, . . . , bN )′, and
M = (I −B)′(I −B). Also define their sample analog â = (â1, . . . , âN )′, B̂ = (̂b1, . . . , b̂N )′,
and M̂ = (I − B̂)′(I − B̂). For each s = 1, . . . , S, further define linear transformation
As ∈ RN×K such that τs = Asτ , i.e., τs is the “effect vector” at time T + s. We introduce
the following invertibility assumption:
Assumption 1. (Invertibility)
∑S
s=1A
′
sMAs is invertible.
Assumption 1 excludes cases where all units are treated at a certain time period t. This
assumption identifies the distribution of some population quantity that is centered at the
true parameter, which facilitates the unbiased estimation. Note that this assumption is
testable in principle, when B is identified.
2.3. Estimation of parameters of interest
As discussed in the previous section, the treatment effects are not identified, so consistent
estimation is impossible. In this section, we propose an asymptotically unbiased estimator
of the parameter of interest.
Stacking equation (2.2) for all i’s gives
ut = Yt(0)− (a+BYt(0)),
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where and ut = (u1,t, . . . , uN,t)
′. After the first unit is treated and for some s = 1, . . . , S,
this becomes
uT+s = (I −B)(YT+s − τs)− a. (2.3)
Let ‖ · ‖ be the Euclidean norm and ‖ · ‖F be the Frobenius norm.
Assumption 2. (a) {ut}t≥1 is stationary and has mean zero.
(b) ‖â− a‖ = op(1), ‖B̂ −B‖F = op(1), and ‖(B̂ −B)YT+s(0)‖ = op(1) for each s.
We show that this assumption holds under stationary or co-integrated common factors
when {yi,t(0)} follows a factor structure. See Appendix B for details.
The estimator for τ is given by
τ̂ = arg min
g∈RK
S∑
s=1
‖(I − B̂)(YT+s −Asg)− â‖22
=
(
S∑
s=1
A′sM̂As
)−1( S∑
s=1
A′s(I − B̂)′((I − B̂)YT+s − â)
)
. (2.4)
Then the estimator for γ = Lτ is
γ̂ = Lτ̂ .
Theorem 1. Suppose Assumption 1 and 2 hold. Then, as T →∞,
γ̂ − (γ + LVT ) p→ 0,
where
VT =
(
S∑
s=1
A′sMAs
)−1( S∑
s=1
A′s(I −B)′uT+s
)
and E[VT ] = 0.
That is, γ̂ is an asymptotically unbiased estimator for γ.1
2.4. Inference methods
Suppose we want to test the null hypothesis
H0 : Cτ = d,
where d is a column vector.
1The efficiency of this estimator can be improved by estimating a covariance matrix and using it as a
weighting matrix. See Cao and Dowd (2019) for details.
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We propose an test that is based on Andrews’ test as in Andrews (2003) and Andrews and
Kim (2006), and first applied to the synthetic control methods by Cao and Dowd (2019).
Define the test statistic
P̂ = (Cτ̂ − d)′(Cτ̂ − d).
To form the critical value, first define xt = (1, y1,t, . . . , yN,t)
′. For some θ ∈ RN×(N+1),
let
Vt(θ) =
(
S∑
s=1
A′sMAs
)−1( S∑
s=1
A′s(I −B)′(Yt+s − θxt+s)
)
and its sample analog
V̂t(θ) =
(
S∑
s=1
A′sM̂As
)−1( S∑
s=1
A′s(I − B̂)′(Yt+s − θxt+s)
)
.
Note that under H0, P can be approximated by Vt(θ0)
′C ′CVt(θ0) with θ0 = (a,B). For a
sequence of estimators {θ̂(t)}Tt=1, define
P̂t = V̂t(θ̂
(t))′C ′CV̂t(θ̂(t)).
In practice, one can simply let θ̂(t) = (â, B̂) for each t. Another choice is to use the leave-
S/2-out estimator (see Andrews, 2003). For some θ ∈ RN×(N+1), define
Pt(θ) = Vt(θ)
′C ′CVt(θ)
and its sample analog
P̂t(θ) = V̂t(θ)
′C ′CV̂t(θ).
Note that P̂t = P̂t(θ̂
(t)). The empirical distribution of P̂t is then
F̂ (x) =
1
T
T−S∑
t=1
1{P̂t ≤ x},
and the corresponding (1− α)-quantile is
q̂1−α = inf{x ∈ R : F̂ (x) ≥ 1− α}.
For some significance level α, we reject the null hypothesis if P̂ lies outside the (1− α)-
quantile of the empirical distribution formed by {P̂t}T−St=1 , i.e. reject H0 if P̂ > q̂1−α. The
confidence region can be constructed by inverting the test.
Assumption 3. (a) {ut}t≥1 is ergodic and has finite second moment.
(b) There exists a non-random sequence of positive definite matrices {DT }T≥1 such that
maxt≤T+S ‖D−1T xt‖ = Op(1).
J. Cao and S. Lu / Staggered Synthetic Control 8
(c) ‖(θ̂− θ0)DT ‖F = op(1), and maxt=1,...,T ‖(θ̂(t)− θ0)DT ‖F = op(1), where ‖ · ‖F is the
Frobenius norm.
(d) The distribution function of P1(θ0) is continuous and increasing at its (1−α)-quantile.
We show by Lemma 1 in Appendix B that Part (a)-(c) in Assumption 3 are satisfied by
either stationary or co-integrated common factors.
Comment 2.1. Assumption 2 and 3 are similar in spirit to those given by Chernozhukov
et al. (2018). It is worth noting that those assumptions do not preclude methodologies other
than the synthetic control method. We focus on the synthetic control method because it
has excellent performance when only moderate size datasets are available. One can easily
extend our framework to incorporate other estimators when appropriate.
Theorem 2. Suppose Assumption 1, 2, and 3 hold. Then, under H0,
P(P̂ > q̂1−α)→ α,
as T →∞.
In the same spirit of the weak IV case, even if we are not able to point-identify the
parameter of interest, we can derive the asymptotic distribution of some estimator, based
on which we can conduct valid inference.
2.5. Examples of parameters of interest
In this section we discuss a few parameters of interest that are common in studies with
stagger implementation. For more examples on interesting parameters, see Callaway and
Sant’Anna (2018), which looks at stagger implementation with the difference-in-different
estimator.
2.5.1. Event-time ATT
In this section we introduce how our method can be used to estimate the average treatment
effects on the treated s periods after being treated (ATT of event time s). Throughout, we
assume in the paper that the unit is always treated once it has been treated, i.e. di,t ≤ di,s
if t ≤ s. Extension to cases where the unit can leave the treatment status is straightforward.
Define event time
ei,t =
∑
r≤t
1{di,r = 1}
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and number of observations with event time s
ns =
∑
i,t
1{ei,t = s}.
Then the ATT of event time s is
ATTes =
1
ns
∑
i,t
τi,t1{ei,t = s} = l′sτ
for ls = n
−1
s (1{ri,t = s})(i,t)∈D.
The event time ATT estimator is
ÂTT
e
s =
1
ns
∑
i,t
τ̂i,t1{Ri,t = s} = l′sτ̂
Corollary 1. Under Assumption 1 and 2,
ÂTT
e
s − (ATTes + l′sVT ) p→ 0
with E[l′sVT ] = 0, as T →∞.
That is, the proposed estimators for treatment effects and relevant parameters of interest
are asymptotically unbiased. Also, hypothesis testing can be conducted using the proposed
procedure in Section 2.4.
2.5.2. Various types of policies
It is often important to evaluate the difference in treatment effects induced by various types
of policies. For example, one may want to know how the dynamic treatment effects of Quota
differ from those of Disclosure in terms of female board members.
Suppose there are two types of policy implemented. For i = 1, 2, the event-time ATT at
time s of the i-th policy can be written as ATTei,s = l
′
i,sτ for some li,s properly defined.
Then, the parameter of interest is γ = [l1,s, l2,s]
′τ , and one may look at the hypothesis
H0 : ATT
e
1,s −ATTe2,s = Cτ = 0, where C = l′1,s − l′2,s.
2.6. Comparison to related methods
Our method is related to two streams of literature. First, there is a rising literature on
the difference-in-difference method with staggered adoption (Borusyak and Jaravel, 2016;
de Chaisemartin and D’Haultffuille, 2018; Goodman-Bacon, 2018; Abraham and Sun, 2018;
Athey and Imbens, 2018; Callaway and Sant’Anna, 2018; Strezhnev, 2018; Hull, 2018).
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Among them, the method proposed by Callaway and Sant’Anna (2018) is the most similar to
ours in spirit. They estimate the block-level treatment effects and then construct estimators
for interesting parameters, allowing for great flexibility. However, all of the aforementioned
works rely on some notion of common trend in all units, which is likely to fail in many
cases. By applying the synthetic control method, we allow for cases where common trend
does not hold for at least some units. Besides, in the comparative case studies with moderate
N and T , the synthetic control method often has better finite-sample performance than the
difference-in-difference method does in terms of estimator variability (Ferman and Pinto,
2017).
Another related literature is the recent works on the multivariate synthetic control method
(Cavallo et al., 2013; Firpo and Possebom, 2018; Kreif et al., 2016; Robbins et al., 2017;
Xu, 2017). This literature applies the synthetic control method to cases where more than
one unit is treated by the policy. In principle, each column of τ can be separately estimated
by those methods. However, one common feature of those methods is that they throw away
other treated units when constructing the synthetic control for a specific treated unit, while
the “contaminated” units are often the most important control units. In the case where the
underlying potential outcome model follows a factor structure, simply not including other
treated units in forming weights can potentially cause efficiency loss in the stationary case
and induce bias in the non-stationary case. It is especially so in the time periods when most
control units have been treated.
3. Estimating the Effects of Board Gender Diversity Policies
Policy interventions to address gender equality have generated considerable debates, and
in particular we focus on one that is widely adopted in many European countries: gen-
der equality regulation on corporate boards. Proponents argue that a systematic change is
needed to address the glass ceiling (European Commission, 2012, hereafter the EU Impact
Assessment). Opponents claim that policies like a quota may only benefit the few female
directors, as known as “the golden skirt”, given the supply constraint (Huse, 2011; Seierstad
and Opsahl, 2011), and prior research finds a decrease in firm performance subsequent to
these policies (Ahern and Dittmar, 2012). One way to reconcile the two is to consider the
dynamic effects of the quota policies: do we observe negative short term consequence on
firm performance, in exchange for a better long term societal gender equality. Therefore, we
study the implication of the policy both in the longer term and on the wider society.
Despite the importance to study societal impacts of these policies, most existing papers
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investigate the policies’ impact on firm performance. One reason is the wider societal effects
may take years to be realized, making it difficult to measure. Another reason is these outcome
variables, such as labor employment, are usually observed at the aggregate level, making it
difficult to study in one country. To mitigate these concerns, in this paper, we exploit the
staggered adoption of board gender policies in European countries, and apply the proposed
synthetic control method for staggered adoptions to examine the magnitudes of the dynamic
effects of these policies.
3.1. Background
Gender equality has made great progress in the past century, but while the gender gap on
higher education and entry-level employment has reduced, the gap at the higher business
decision making roles remains large (Bertrand et al., 2011). The EU impact assessment in
2012 claims that women account for 60% of new university graduates who enter the work
force, 35% of the European parliament members, but merely 13.7% of corporate board seats
in large listed companies.
To address the low representation of female on corporate boards, Norway was the first
to propose a 40% quota in 2002. Since then, 13 European countries adopted similar policies
between 2007 and 2017 in a staggered manner. Most recently, California signed a bill in
September 2018 requiring California corporate boards to include at least one woman by the
end of 2019, and at least 2-3 7 woman by July 2021 depending on total board members
(McGreevy, 2018, Los Angeles Times).
Many papers criticize the immediate damage brought by a gender quota. From a firm
perspective, Ahern and Dittmar (2012) finds that stock price dropped at the initial proposal
of the quota law in Norway, suggesting firms chose their board structure to maximize firm
value before the gender quota policy. They further find that the number of public firms de-
clined substantially compared to the number of private firms, evidencing avoidance behavior
as a result of the gender quota. However, a more recent paper, Eckbo et al. (2016) fails to
find the same effect. Lu (2019) finds that due to supply constraint of female directors, firms
subject to the quota hire more foreign female directors, and female directors with less public
board experience.
These papers suggest that in the short run, quota causes distortion from the optimal
market-driven equilibrium. However, these findings alone cannot speak to the desirability of
the policy. It is important to study the intended benefits of a board gender policy, especially
in the long run. Recently, Bertrand et al. (2018) revisits the Norwegian quota setting by
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studying the long term impact seven years after the quota became compulsory, they find a
reduction in gender pay gap within boards, but do not find an increase in female represen-
tation or earnings in other roles outside of the board room. In other words, the quota rule
benefited female directors but did not trickle down to other female leadership roles, which
was also a goal of the quota mandate in Norway. They further examine other wider social
impacts, and find an increase in female pursuing an education in business, but they also
find the same result for engineering degrees.
Our goal is to study the long term societal effects of board gender equality policies,
similar to Bertrand et al. (2018), and expand to settings involving all European countries
that announced such a policy. While many papers study the effect of these policies in specific
countries, very few study across countries.
There are three channels a quota policy can bring long term benefits. First, a quota
may lead firms to invest in a long term pipeline for female leadership, such as establishing
mentorship opportunities. Second, the presence of female directors may motivate younger
female employees to invest in career development, as they see the possibility of rising to
the top. Third, diversity has a motivating role where a female in the management role can
empower other junior female employees through mentoring and better work environment
(Dezso¨ and Ross, 2012). For example, because of her own experience, Sheryl Sandberg
demanded pregnancy parking spots at Facebook, but such female oriented policies demanded
by non-leadership level female employees may never be heard. All three channels suggest
that in the long term, there will may be more female participating in the workplace, and
many who may choose and make it to a leadership position.
In the long term, if the supply of qualified female leaders increase, many of the short
term consequences, such as the golden skirt phenomenon, no longer apply. However, not all
critiques of the quota policy go away, and some may even hinder the realization of the above
benefits. It could be the case that corporate board member represents only a small group,
which is too small to make an impact in the society. Further, board members selected based
on token, instead of merit, may be less able to foster change in the company (Leszczyn´ska,
2018).
Therefore, it is an empirical question whether a quota policy can lead to long term gender
equality benefits in the labor market.
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3.2. Data and Sample
To study wider societal effects of the board gender policies, we use labor outcome variables
come from the EU Labor Force Survey (LFS), which is the largest household survey on
annual and quarterly employment status covering 35 European countries. We use quarterly
data from 2003Q1 to 2018Q4 at a country level, and after removing countries with missing
data, we are left with 23 countries in most cases. Given the small number of countries,
standard large sample asymptotics with respect to units does not apply. Specifically, the
popular generalized difference-in-difference method is not ideal. It also suffers from problems
such as assuming strong homogeneity in order to produce interpretable results, and requiring
parallel trend. In Figure 1, we plot the coefficients of fitting part-time female to male ratio
with a generalized difference-in-difference model with country and time fixed effect. The plot
shows that while the pre-trend does not show significant deviation from zero, the standard
error is very large as a result of the small sample. As such, we use a synthetic control method
that exploits the pre-treatment data in order to form better counter-factual prediction.
We focus on part-time employment as our outcome variable, since it captures the extent
to which female is willing to invest in work. We hypothesize that fewer women will choose
to go part-time because of family reasons if they see a higher chance of breaking the glass
ceiling at work. Part time is defined as people in employment who usually work less than
30 hours per week in their main job. Relative to participation and employment decisions,
part-time decision is more likely to be affected by the policies. This is because it is less
costly to switch from working 30 hours, to 40 hours a week, compared to switching from
not working, to working.
In addition to labor data, data on board directors comes from BoardEx. See table 1 for
summary statistics on labor and director variables. The announcement dates of the board
gender policies are hand collected from each EU countries’ official website and with help
from Seierstad et al. (2017). We include countries where the policy setters introduce a quota
or target for corporate board female ratio, this includes mandatory quotas and those with a
disclosure requirement to comply or explain. We set treatment as the announcement quarter
of a board gender policy to take into consideration any anticipation effects. See table 2 for
each countries’ policy.
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3.3. Results
3.3.1. Board gender ratio
We first show the direct effect of the board gender policies on the female presentation on
corporate boards. Figure 2 shows the results from the staggered synthetic control where the
outcome variable is the average percentage of female on corporate boards in a country.
Figure 2(a) shows the average treatment effect for each of the first eight years after
the announcement of the policies. On average, there is a 2% increase in the percentage of
female in corporate boards one year after the policy announcement, and this effect gradually
increases to 6% after four years, and 16% after 8 years. This evidenced that the effect of the
policy is realized gradually over the years.
Figure 2(b) plots all the individual treatment effects for the treated units over calendar
time and event time. These treatment effects can be interpreted as residuals by taking the
difference between the realized outcome and the synthetic control at each time point. This
graph allows us to visually see the fit of the synthetic control before the treatment period,
and that all the treated units experience an increase in their board female ratio after the
treatment event.
3.3.2. Employment outcomes
Next, we examine labor outcomes. We first consider part-time employment, which we ex-
pect to decrease after the treatment event if female employees are motivated to invest more
in their career. Figure 3 shows the staggered synthetic control results for three occupation
groups: professional, worker, and basic employees. These categories are based on the Inter-
national Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO), as provided in Eurostat. For all
labor outcomes, we use the ratio of female to male to control for other macro economic in-
fluence on these labor outcomes. We then take the logarithm to allow easier interpretation,
especially for results based on the number of employments in thousands.
Figure 3 shows that there is around 10% decrease in the part-time employment ratio
for the professional occupation group, a similar but less persistent decrease for the worker
occupation group, and no effect for the basic occupation group. This suggests that a higher
female representation on corporate boards motivate female professionals, and perhaps work-
ers, to take part in full-time employment instead of part-time. Under the assumption that a
female employee chooses to take part in part-time employment by weighting between career
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success and family commitment, a higher chance of career success may deter some female
from going part-time.
To further examine the validity of this result, we show this effect in two additional tests.
First, figure 3 shows the change in part-time employment for professional employees by
gender. This result shows a decrease in female part-time employees, but no significant effect
on male part-time employees. While the change converges to zero in latter periods, it may
also suggest we are extrapolating too long, as the confidence interval increases.
Second, we look at the flip side of part-time employment, which is full-time employment,
to rule out the possibility that the decrease in part-time employment is due to females
choosing to leave the labor market all together. Figure 5 shows an increase in full-time
employment ratio of around 4%, and only for the professional occupation group.
There are a few caveats with the current test. First, because of data limitation, the
amount of observations vary across the various labor outcomes. Robustness tests limiting to
a smaller subsample of observations yield similar results. Second, in order to have sufficient
observations in the pre-treatment period, countries that announced a policy prior to 2010
are dropped, and this includes Norway, Spain, Finland, and Iceland.
4. Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a new synthetic control method to study effects of policies with
staggered adoption. Our method overcomes limitations in existing methodologies, and gives
asymptotically unbiased estimators of many interesting quantities and delivers asymptot-
ically valid inference. There is potential for a wide application of this staggered synthetic
control, since many policies are replicated in other regions at different timings.
We apply the staggered synthetic control method to study how corporate board gender
policies affect long term labor outcomes related to gender equality. By exploiting variation
in the staggered announcement of board gender policies across European countries, we can
estimate the dynamic treatment effect on gender and labor outcomes.
Our paper sheds light on the extend to which the board gender policies enhance gender
equality in the labor market. We find some evidence that the policies lead to a decrease
in part-time employment, and an increase in full-time employment for female employees.
This effect is limited to female in professional occupations. This may suggest the higher
female representation at the board level motivates other professional female employees,
and this higher likelihood of breaking the glass ceiling deter them from choosing part-time
employment. We do not find effects on the extensive margin, including labor participation
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and employment.
While prior paper examining board gender policies focus on the short term firm level
impact, we provide evidence on the long term societal impact, which is the main objective of
these policies. This is feasible partly because of our proposed methodology using staggered
synthetic control. Using staggered synthetic control has various advantages over existing
methods to study this research question with aggregated country-level data and staggered
adoption of policies. In particular, we mitigate concerns about the violation of parallel trend
assumption in small sample setting, and we use all important units in forming the synthetic
control, including treated units.
Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. Using Equation 2.4, we have
τ̂ =
(
S∑
s=1
A′sM̂As
)−1( S∑
s=1
A′s(I − B̂)′((I − B̂)τs + YT+s(0)− B̂YT+s(0)− â)
)
=
(
S∑
s=1
A′sM̂As
)−1( S∑
s=1
A′s(I − B̂)′(I − B̂)Asτ
)
+
(
S∑
s=1
A′sM̂As
)−1( S∑
s=1
A′s(I − B̂)′(uT+s + (B − B̂)YT+s(0) + (a− â))
)
=τ + VT +
(
S∑
s=1
A′sM̂As
)−1( S∑
s=1
A′s(I − B̂)′((B − B̂)YT+s(0) + (a− â))
)
=τ + VT +
(
S∑
s=1
A′sMAs + op(1)
)−1( S∑
s=1
A′s(I −B + op(1))′(op(1) + op(1))
)
=τ + VT + op(1).
The first equality is by the definition of τs. The second equality is by Equation (2.2). The
fourth and fifth equations are by Assumption 1 and 2. Therefore,
γ̂ − (γ + LVT ) = L(τ̂ − τ − VT ) = op(1).
In addition, E[VT ] = 0 by Assumption 2(a).
Proof of Theorem 2. We follow the proof of Theorem 2 in Andrews and Kim (2006). We
use fours steps to show the theorem.
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Step 1. We first show P̂
d→ P∞, where P∞ has the same distribution as V1(θ0)′C ′CV1(θ0).
Using the result of Theorem 1 and letting L be the identity matrix, we have
τ̂ − τ = VT + op(1) d→ V1(θ0),
so under the null,
Cτ̂ − d = (Cτ̂ − d)− (Cτ − d) d→ CV1(θ0).
Applying the continuous mapping theorem, we have P̂
d→ P∞.
Step 2. Let F (x) and q1−α be the distribution function and the (1 − α)-quantile of P∞,
respectively. Next, we show F̂ (x)
p→ F (x) for all x in a neighborhood of q1−α.
Define
Ws =
(
S∑
r=1
A′rMAr
)−1
A′s(I −B)′
and its sample analog
Ŵs =
(
S∑
r=1
A′rM̂Ar
)−1
A′s(I − B̂)′.
Let
L1,T (ε) =
{
‖(θ̂ − θ0)DT ‖F ≤ ε, max
t=1,...,T
‖(θ̂(t) − θ0)DT ‖F ≤ ε
}
,
L2,T (c) =
{
max
t≤T+S
‖D−1T xt‖ ≤ c
}
,
L3,T (η) =
{
∀r, s s.t. 1 ≤ r ≤ S, 1 ≤ s ≤ S, ‖Ŵ ′rC ′CŴs −W ′rC ′CWs‖F < η
}
.
By Assumption 3(c), there exists a positive sequence {εT }T≥1 such that εT → 0 and
P(L1,T (εT )) → 1. Let cT = 1/√εT . So we have cT → ∞ and cT εT → 0. By Assumption
3(b), we must have P(L2,T (cT ))→ 1. By Assumption 3(b), there exists a positive sequence
{ηT }T≥1 such that ηT → 0 and P(L3,T (ηT ))→ 1. Let LT = L1,T (εT )∩L2,T (cT )∩L3,T (ηT ),
then we have P(LT )→ 1 and P(LcT )→ 0.
Suppose LT holds. Then, for some θ = θ̂ or θ = θ̂
(t) and for some t = 1, . . . , T , we have
|P̂t(θ)− Pt(θ0)| ≤ |P̂t(θ)− Pt(θ)|+ |Pt(θ)− Pt(θ0)|. (A.1)
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Note that
|P̂t(θ)− Pt(θ)|
=
∣∣∣∣∣
S∑
r=1
S∑
s=1
(Yt+r − θxt+r)′(Ŵ ′rC ′CŴs −W ′rC ′CWs)(Yt+s − θxt+s)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
S∑
r=1
S∑
s=1
‖Yt+r − θxt+r‖‖Ŵ ′rC ′CŴs −W ′rC ′CWs‖F ‖Yt+s − θxt+s‖
≤
S∑
r=1
S∑
s=1
‖ut+r + (θ0 − θ)xt+r‖ · ηT · ‖ut+s + (θ0 − θ)xt+s‖
≤
S∑
r=1
S∑
s=1
(‖ut+r‖+ ‖(θ0 − θ)DTD−1T xt+r‖)ηT (‖ut+s‖+ ‖(θ0 − θ)DTD−1T xt+s‖)
≤
S∑
r=1
S∑
s=1
(‖ut+r‖+ ‖(θ0 − θ)DT ‖F ‖D−1T xt+r‖)ηT (‖ut+s‖+ ‖(θ0 − θ)DT ‖F ‖D−1T xt+s‖)
≤
S∑
r=1
S∑
s=1
(‖ut+r‖+ εT cT )(‖ut+s‖+ εT cT )ηT (A.2)
and
|Pt(θ)− Pt(θ0)|
≤
S∑
r=1
S∑
s=1
|(Yt+r − θxt+r)′W ′rC ′CWs(Yt+s − θxt+s)− (Yt+r − θxt+r)′W ′rC ′CWs(Yt+s − θ0xt+s)|
+ |(Yt+r − θxt+r)′W ′rC ′CWs(Yt+s − θ0xt+s)− (Yt+r − θxt+r)′W ′rC ′CWs(Yt+s − θxt+s)|
=
S∑
r=1
S∑
s=1
|(ut+r + (θ0 − θ)xt+r)′W ′rC ′CWs(θ0 − θ)xt+s|+ |((θ0 − θ)xt+r)′W ′rC ′CWsut+s|
≤
S∑
r=1
S∑
s=1
(‖ut+r‖+ ‖ut+s‖+ εT cT )‖W ′rC ′CWs‖F εT ct. (A.3)
Combining (A.1), (A.2), and (A.3), we have
|P̂t(θ)− Pt(θ0)| ≤ g(εT , cT , ηT ),
where
gt(εT , cT , ηT )
=
S∑
r=1
S∑
s=1
(‖ut+r‖+ εT cT )(‖ut+s‖+ εT cT )ηT + (‖ut+r‖+ ‖ut+s‖+ εT cT )‖W ′rC ′CWs‖F εT ct.
By Assumption 2(a), gt(εT , cT , ηT ) is identically distributed across t for a fixed T .
let k : R→ R be a monotonically decreasing and everywhere differentiable function that
has bounded derivative and satisfies k(x) = 1 for x ≤ 0, k(x) ∈ [0, 1] for x ∈ (0, 1), and
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k(x) = 0 for x ≥ 1. For example, let k(x) = cos(pix)/2 + 1/2 for x ∈ (0, 1). Given some
sequence {pt}Tt=1, a smoothed distribution function is defined by
F˜ (x, {pt}, hT ) = 1
T
T∑
t=1
k
(
pt − x
hT
)
,
for some sequence of positive constants {hT } such that hT → 0, cT εT /hT → 0, and ηT /hT →
0. For example, we can let hT = max{√εT cT ,√ηT }.
Define FT (x) =
1
T
∑T−S
t=1 1{Pt(θ0) ≤ x}. We write
|F̂ (x)− F (x)| ≤
4∑
i=1
Di,T ,
for
D1,T = |F̂ (x)− F˜ (x, {P̂t}, hT )|,
D2,T = |F˜ (x, {P̂t}, hT )− F˜ (x, {Pt(θ0)}, hT )|,
D3,T = |F˜ (x, {Pt(θ0)}, hT )− FT (x)|, and
D4,T = |FT (x)− F (x)|.
We want to show that all four terms vanish. First note that
D1,T ≤ 1
T
T∑
t=1
1
{
P̂t(θ̂
(t))− x
hT
∈ (0, 1)
}
.
Thus, for any δ > 0,
P(D1,T > δ) ≤ P({D1,T > δ} ∩ LT ) + P(LcT )
≤ P
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
1 {Pt(θ0)− x ∈ (−gt(εT , cT , ηT ), hT + gt(εT , cT , ηT )} > δ
)
+ o(1)
≤ E1 {Pt(θ0)− x ∈ (−gt(εT , cT , ηT ), hT + gt(εT , cT , ηT )}
δ
+ o(1), (A.4)
where the last inequality is by Markov’s inequality. Recall P(P1(θ0) 6= x) = 1 and
gt(εT , cT , ηT )→ 0 almost surely, so 1{Pt(θ0)−x ∈ {−gt(εT , cT , ηT ), hT+gt(εT , cT , ηT )} → 0
almost surely. By the dominated convergence theorem, (A.4) implies P(D1,T > δ) ≤ o(1)
and thus D1,T = op(1).
For D2,T , we have
D2,T =
∣∣∣∣∣ 1T
T∑
t=1
k′
(
P˜t − x
hT
)
P̂t(θ̂
(t))− Pt(θ0)
hT
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ k¯
T
T∑
t=1
gt(εT , cT , ηT )
hT
.
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The equality is by the mean value theorem and we have P˜t lies between P̂t(θ̂
(t)) and Pt(θ0).
In the inequality, k¯ is a bound for the derivative of k. Also, note
E
[
gt(εT , cT , ηT )
hT
]
=
S∑
r=1
S∑
s=1
(‖ut+r‖+ εT cT )(‖ut+s‖+ εT cT )ηT + (‖ut+r‖+ ‖ut+s‖+ εT cT )‖W ′rC ′CWs‖F εT ct.
=
S∑
r=1
S∑
s=1
(
E[‖ut+r‖‖ut+s‖]ηT
hT
+
2E[‖ut+r‖]εT cT ηT
hT
+
ε2T c
2
T ηT
hT
+
2E[‖ut+r‖]‖W ′rC ′CWs‖F εT cT
hT
+
ε2T c
2
T ‖W ′rC ′CWs‖F
hT
)
=o(1).
Therefore,
P(D2,T > δ) ≤ P({D2,T > δ} ∩ LT ) + P(LcT )
≤ P
(
k¯
T
T∑
t=1
gt(εT , cT , ηT )
hT
> δ
)
+ o(1)
≤ k¯ Egt(εT , cT , ηT )
δhT
→ 0.
The third inequality is by Markov’s inequality. This shows D2,T = op(1).
D3,T is similar to the D1,T case. Finally, by stationary and ergodicity of ut, we have
D4,T = op(1). This implies F̂ (x)
p→ F (x).
Step 3. Now we show q̂1−α
p→ q1−α. Pick any small ε such that F̂ (x) p→ F (x) for x ∈
(q1−α − ε, q1−α + ε). Note
P(q̂1−α > q1−α + ε) ≤ P(F̂ (q1−α + ε) < 1− α)
= P(F̂ (q1−α + ε)− F (q1−α + ε) < (1− α)− F (q1−α + ε))
→ 0.
The inequality is by definition of q̂1−α. The convergence is by Assumption 3(d) and Step 2.
Similarly,
P(q̂1−α < q1−α − ε) ≤ P(F̂ (q1−α − ε) ≥ 1− α)
= P(F̂ (q1−α − ε)− F (q1−α − ε) ≥ (1− α)− F (q1−α − ε))
→ 0.
Thus, P(|q̂1−α − q1−α| > ε)→ 0.
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Step 4. Finally, we show P(P̂ > q̂1−α)→ α. Under null, we have
P(P̂ > q̂1−α) = 1− P(P̂ ≤ q̂1−α)
= 1− P(P̂ + (q1−α − q̂1−α) ≤ q1−α)
→ α,
where the convergence is by combining Step 1 and 3. This concludes our proof.
Proof of Corollary 1. This corollary is a direct application of Theorem 1 where L = l′s.
Appendix B: Low level assumptions
In this section we provide a set of low-level conditions under which Assumption 2 and 3
hold. Following Ferman and Pinto (2017) and Cao and Dowd (2019), we consider a factor
model such that for i = 1, . . . , N and t = 1, . . . , T + S,
yi,t(0) = λ
′
ift + εi,t, (B.1)
where ft is finite-dimensional common factors. For notation simplicity, we write Yt(0) =
(y1,t(0), . . . , yN,t(0))
′, Yt = (y1,t, . . . , yN,t)′, and εt = (ε1,t, . . . , εN,t)′.
Condition ST (model with stationary common factors). Assume {(ft, εt)}t≥1 is stationary,
ergodic for the first and second moments, and has finite (2 + δ)-moment for some δ > 0.
Assume cov[Yt(0)] = Ωy is positive definite.
Condition CO (model with cointegrated I(1) common factors). Rewrite Equation (B.1)
as
yi,t(0) = (λ
1
i )
′f1t + (λ
0
i )
′f0t + εi,t.
Assume {(f0t , t)}t≥1 is stationary, ergodic for the first and second moments, and has finite 4-
th moment. Without loss of generality, E[εi,t] = 0. Assume {f1t }t≥1 is I(1). Further assume
for each i, yi,t(0) is such that weak convergence holds for T
−1/2yi,[rT ](0)⇒ νi(r), where⇒ is
weak convergence and process νi(r) is defined on [0, 1] and has bounded continuous sample
path almost surely. For each i, let W (i) = {(w1, . . . , wN ) ∈ RN+ : wi = 0,
∑
j 6=i wj = 1}.
Assume for each i, there exists w(i) ∈W (i) such that λ1i =
∑N
j=1 w
(i)
j λ
1
j . That is, (w
(i)− ei)
is a cointegrating vector for Yt(0), where ei is a unit vector with i-th entry being one and
zeros everywhere else.
The following lemma shows that under the factor model, either stationarity or co-
integration implies the high-level assumptions in the paper.
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Lemma 1. Suppose the distribution function of P1(θ0) is continuous and increasing at its
(1−α)-quantile. Then, either Condition ST or Condition CO implies Assumption 2 and 3.
Proof. This lemma is implied by Lemma 1 and 3 of Cao and Dowd (2019). The main idea
is to use the projection of the least-square estimator onto a constraint set. For similar proof
strategies, see Li (2019), Yu et al. (2019), and Yu (2020).
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Table 1
Summary Statistics: Labor Outcomes in Europe
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES N mean sd p25 p50 p75
Board F/M Ratio 266 0.101 0.0688 0.0525 0.0787 0.128
Part Time by Occupation
Professional F (thousands) 845 448.8 521.9 61.6 227.9 715.7
Professional M (thousands) 845 147.6 164.8 25.6 79.6 247
Professional F/M ratio 845 2.783 0.764 2.266 2.761 3.296
Worker F/M ratio 845 3.743 1.847 1.99 3.686 4.742
Basic F/M ratio 845 2.847 1.659 1.672 2.128 3.791
Full Time by Occupation
Professional F/M ratio 1,430 0.905 0.332 0.649 0.844 1.18
Worker F/M ratio 1,430 0.678 0.195 0.565 0.686 0.795
Basic F/M ratio 1,430 0.436 0.179 0.32 0.431 0.54
Participation Rate by Education
Advanced F/M ratio 1,472 0.943 0.0403 0.916 0.95 0.97
Intermediate F/M ratio 1,472 0.835 0.0642 0.795 0.834 0.883
Basic F/M ratio 1,472 0.61 0.104 0.541 0.616 0.688
Employment Rate by Education
Advanced F/M ratio 1,495 0.924 0.0431 0.894 0.928 0.955
Intermediate F/M ratio 1,495 0.838 0.0755 0.786 0.851 0.895
Basic F/M ratio 1,495 0.689 0.123 0.625 0.71 0.774
Employment by Education
Advanced F/M ratio 1,495 1.143 0.274 0.938 1.105 1.325
Intermediate F/M ratio 1,495 0.769 0.0852 0.719 0.755 0.815
Basic F/M ratio 1,495 0.742 0.244 0.539 0.734 0.876
Employment by Occupation
Professional F/M ratio 1,430 1.023 0.251 0.834 0.956 1.203
Worker F/M ratio 1,430 0.886 0.169 0.75 0.881 1.011
Basic F/M ratio 1,430 0.57 0.163 0.466 0.532 0.647
Table 2
Corporate Board Gender Policies in Europe
Country Policy Sup/Exe Announced Implemented
Austria Quota Sup 2017 2018
Belgium Quota Both 2011 2017
Denmark Disclosure Sup 2012 2013
Finland Disclosure Sup 2008 2010
France Quota Sup 2011 2014
Germany Quota/Disclosure Sup 2015 2016
Iceland Disclosure Sup 2010 2013
Italy Quota Both 2011 2012
Netherlands Disclosure Both 2013 2016
Norway Quota Both 2003 2008
Portugal Quota Both 2017 2018
Spain Quota Both 2007 2015
Sweden Quota Both 2014 2016
United Kingdom Disclosure Both 2011 2015
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Fig 1: Coefficients Plot for Generalized Diff-in-diff
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Fig 2: Corporate Board Gender Policies and Female Ratio
(a) Average treatment effect
(b) Residual plot
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Fig 3: Part Time Employment (thousands) by Occupation
(a) Professional: ATT (b) Professional: Residual
(c) Worker: ATT (d) Worker: Residual
(e) Basic: ATT (f) Basic: Residual
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Fig 4: Part Time Professional Employment (thousands) by Gender
(a) Female: ATT (b) Female: Residual
(c) Male: ATT (d) Male: Residual
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Fig 5: Full Time Employment (thousands) by Occupation
(a) Professional: ATT (b) Professional: Residual
(c) Worker: ATT (d) Worker: Residual
(e) Basic: ATT (f) Basic: Residual
